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The Great Bull Markets 1924—29
and 1982—87: Speculative Bubbles
or Economic Fundamentals?
G. J. Santoni
Every so often, it seems, humankind almost en masse has a compulsion to
speculate, and it yields to that compulsion with abandon,
— Robert T. I’atterson, The Great Boom and Panic, p xiii.
Il%~IIANYpeople attribute the bull man-ket of 1924—
29 and the subsequent collapse in stock prices to a
speculative bubble.’’’ According to this view, the
m:rash was inevitable because it was only a matter of
time until the bubble burst Isee shaded insert on
opposite page).
The same theory of stock price formation is used to
descn-ibe the bull market of l982—87. Recent discus-
sions have characterized tills bull market as the prod-
uct of ‘unexpected insanity,’’ subject to ‘‘trading fads
and frenzies rather than economic h.nndamnentals’’and
‘out of control .‘‘~Comparisons between thie 1920s and
1980s like the one summarized in chart I have ap-
peared recently in the press.’ Chart 1, which plots
quarterly data on the levels of the Dow Jones lndus-
G. J. Santoni is a senioreconomist at the FederalReserve Bank of St.
Louis. Thomas A. Pci/mann provided research assistance.
‘Seethe shaded insert on page and Kindleberger (1978), p.17.
7”Abreast of the Market” (1987) and Jonas and Farrell (1986).
3See, for example, Koepp (1957), Powell (1987), Schwartz and
Tsiantar (1987) and Wall Street Journal(1987).
trial Index over the two periods, shows that the behav-
ior’ of stock prices in both periods is sitiiilam.’ Both bull
tnarkets began mi the second quarter’ ofthe year-; each
lasted 21 quarter’s; each hit its peak in the third quarter
with the timing of the peaks separated by only a few
days (September 3, 1929, and August 25, 1987); in each
case, 54days elapsed between the peak and the crash;
arId each crasli str-ipped slightly mor’e than 20 percent
fioni the stock market averages.
‘l’he belief that speculative bubbles might cause a
persistent deviation in stock pm-ices fr-onn the pm-ice
consistent with tile fundamentals is impom-tant. At the
timile of the 1929 crash, it spawned legislative proposals
that would cut-b credit for’ speculation, amend the
National Banking and Federal Resetx’e acts, impose an
excise tax on stock sales and n-egulate the activities of
stock exchanges and investment trusts.’ Furthermore,
‘Scale (1982—87) = S x scale (1924—29).
5New York Times (October 25, 1929).
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if stock pm’ice bubbles exist, economic policvmaker’s
face a difficult pr-oblem because bubbles suggest that
plans to save and invest may be based on irrational
criteria arid subject to em-r-aticchange.”
‘h’he purpose of this paper is to compare tile inrnpli—
cations of atheory of stock prices based on fundarneni—
tals to one that allows for’ bubbles, then to examine
~Keynes(1935), p. 159. Keynes discussed erratic shiftsin the invest-
ment schedule caused by changes in the “state ofconfidence” (pp.
153—55) and “speculation” (p. 161). He argues that a
boom which is destined to end in a slump is caused,
therefore, by the combination of a rate of interest, which in a
correctstate of expectationwould be moo high for full employment,
with a misguided stare of expectation which, so long as it lasts,
preventsthis rate oninterest from being in tact deterrent A boom
is a situation in which over-optimism tr,umphs over a rate of
interest which, in a cooler tight, would be seen to beexcessive”
(p. 322).
See, as well, Gordon (1952), p,
378 and Varian (1979).
e~idencefrom the 1920s and the 1980s to determine
which set of implications is suppom’ted by the data.
The behavtor of stock prices during these two pen’iods
is patticu-lam’ useful in testing asset prices Din’ the
presence of speculative bubbles. The 1 924—29 experi-
ence is one of the most significant bull markets in U.S.
history in both its dun-anon and nate of advance.
Thoughi riot quite as rir-aniatic. the behavior of stock
~ in the 1980s has tieeti similar~.If stock price
bubbles exist, these are likely places to look for’ them
THE FUNDAMENTALS
OF STOCK PRICES
People value common stocks for their expected
n’ef ut-n. Since irivestot’s mua choose among Iiroarl cate-
gories ol’stock, the expected r’ettrm-n on an~’ particular
stock must be equal to the expected return on other’
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Chart 1
The BuD Marketsof the 1920s and 198OsL~i
Dow Jones Industrial Index (Nominal Va’ues)
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stocks of similar risk- For example, ifaparticular’ stock
is expected to yield a relatively low return, inyestots
will shun it causing its price to fall, This raises its
expected retun’n, ‘the reverse holds for any stock with
an expected return that is higher than otherstocks of
similar risk, An equilibrium exists when the expected
m’eturns are equal actoss equally risky stocks- Econo-
mists call this equilibrium retur’n the t-equired dis-
count rate, Equation t calculates the expected retur’n
from holding a stock for’ one year- assuming dividends
are paid at year-end,’
(1) Expected Rate of Return =
Forecast ofpr’ice at yearend ±Forecast
of dividend — Current Price
Current Price
Equation 2 solves equation 1 forthe current price by
noting that the expected retun’n is equal to the re-
quired discount rate in equilibrium.
(2) Current Pt-ice =
Forecast of price at year-end + For-ecast
of dividend
(1 + Required discount tate)
The Price Depends on Forecasts
ofFuture Outcomes
The impor’tant thing to note in equation 2 is that
the current price depends on forecasts offuture out-
comes which, of course, are subject to change as new
information becomes available. ‘the price does not
depend on dividends that at-c observed in the present
as Senator King and others have implied in their
comments on the hehavion’ of stock pt-ices during the
1920s (see shaded insert on page 171. The current price
may change even though observed dividends do not
and conversely.
How Far Ahead?
The discussion so far indicates that investors
must forecast the price of the stock next period. What
are the fi,tndarnentals for this future pm-ice? In princi-
ple, the future pt’ice depends on the stn-ean of divi-
dends and the required discount rate investors expect
to prevail over- the life of the firm, Typically this n-c-
quin’esforecasts that extend into the distant future and
suggests that the job ofanalyzing stockprices is formi-
‘See Brealey (1983), pp. 67—72, and Brealey and Meyers (1984), pp.
43—58,
dahle. It is sometimes possible to simplify the calcula-
tion, however. If dividends are expected to grow at a
constant annual rate and the discount rate is con-
stant, the calculation can lie simplified as shown in
equation 3.’
(3) Cut-cent Price =
Fot-ecast of dividend
Required discount rate — Expected growth
rate of dividends
The PriceFundamentals
Restating the solution for the current price as in
equation 3 is particularly useful for the purposes of
this paper. Equation 3i sa list of the pt-ice fundanien-
tals: the forecast of the dividend next period, the
required discount rate, and the expected forecast)
growth t-ate of dividends. The solution for the current
price in equation 3 is called the fundamentals price.
Furthermore, the equation can he used to show how
relatively small changes in forecasts can account for
relatively lam-gechanges in the fundamentals pt-ice. For
example, suppose investors forecast a year-end clivi-
dend of 5.60 per’ shame, an annual dividend growth tate
of 6 pet-cent arid the r’equir’ed chscount mate is 8 pet-
cent. Equation 3 indicates that the fundamentals price
is $30 per share [=.6/),08—.06)], Now suppose that
new information leads investors to lower the f’ot-ecast
of dividend growth to 5 percent. This is a decline of
about 17 percent in expected gm-owth 1= l,01/,0611001.
The fundamentals pt-ice, however, declines to $20
.6/LOS — .05)1, or more than 30 percent. Notice that a
latge decline in price may occur even though observed
dividend payments do riot change. It is even possible
for the pt-ice to decline when observed dividends rise.
STOCK PRICES AND MEASURES
OF THE FUNDAMENTALS
Table 1 shows annual average growth rates ofthe
Dow Jones Industrial Index in each year during the
two hull mar’kets.” The index rose tapidl~during the
‘Brealey(1983), p. 69. Thecurrentprice is defined by equation 3 only
if the expected growth rate in dividends is less than the required
discount rate.
‘The data on stock prices used in thispaper are dailyclosing levelsof
the Dow Jones Industrial Index. Dailyclosing levels of this index are
available on a consistent basis from January 1915. See Pierce
(1962). Whenpossible, the statistical results obtainedwith this data
were checked against results using daily closing levels of the
Standard and Poor’s Composite Index, In no case were any qualita-
tive differences observed.
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Long-ter-mn rates were roughly constant I’m-om 1924—
29.”’ Data on actual per share dividends are very
sketchy for this period. One estimate, however, indi-
catesthat actual dlividends itiereasedi at an annual n’ate
of about 8.8 percent from 1924—29.” While this is a
fairly rapid rate of mid-ease, it is far less than the
growth observed in stockvalues. (See shadled inset-t on
opposite page fot’a rnor’e precise estinnate of the rela-
tionship between stock prices and these pt-ox~van—
ahles.I When the market ci-ashed, people like Senator
King pointed to these proxy variables atid claimed that
stock pt’ices liefrire October- 1929 contained ‘water
and hot air.’’ Art alternative explanation is that the




In rirder to evaluate the notion that stock prices in
the 192Os arid! l9SOs were driven by psychological
factors extraneous to the fundamentals, it is necessary
to be cleam’er’ aliout the implications the alter’native
h~potlieseshave for var’iables that can he observed by
the investigator. This paper considers three different
theories that potentially explain stock prices: the ef-
ficient market hypothesis, the greater fool theory and
the theory of rational buhibles.
Efficient ilIarkets and Fundamentals
A long—standing pr’oPosition in both economics
am! finance is that stock pnces are formed in efficient
mar-kets.’” This means that all of the relevant infom-ma—
lion currently known about ititemest rates, dividends
and the futum-e prospects for firnis is contained in
current stock prices. Stock pr-ices change only when
tiew infot-niation m-egarding the humidarnentals is ob-
tained by someone. New information, by dlefinition,
cannot lie predicted aheadi rif its arrival; because the
news is just as likelyto he goodias it is to lie bad, jumps
in stock pr-ices cannot be pr’edicted in advance.
Many present—day stock niar’ket analysts arc skepti-
cal of the efficient markets hypothesis.” Similarly,
“See Friedman and Schwartz (1982), table 4.8, and Homer (1977), p.
352.
“See Cowles (1938), p.389.
“See Brealey and Meyers (1984), pp. 266—81; Malkiel (1981), PP.
171—79; Brealey (1983), pp. 15—18; Leroy (1982) and Fama (1970).
“See Malkiel (1981), Pp. 126—79.
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traders in time I920s germerally did mmot subscribe to it
(see slmaded insent (in followimmg page). But that is riot
important. Ifthe behavior’ of stock pm-ices is commsistent
with time implications of time theory, the imypothesis
imeips both to understammdl hmow stock nuam’kets wom’k
and to evaluate the claim that time hull markets wem’e
products of price hufibies.
If the efficienut rnan-kets hypothesis is cor’rec.t, past
pr-ice changes contairu no useful information ahiout
future pr-ice changes. With some added assumptions,
this carm he tm-ammsiated into useful empim-ical pn’oposi—
tions. If tIme expected return to holdimmg stock is con—
stanit ammd time volatility of stock prices does mmot cimange
during time time pem’iod examined, time efficient market
hypothesis implies that observed changes in stock
pm-ices should he unicorn-elated amid tiuat lir’ice cimammges
shouidl riot exhibit long sedluences of successive
changes that are gr-eatem- om- less than time median
cimammge for time sample.
‘time above propositions should hold everm if timelevel
of stock pm-ices appears to drift upward or dowmmwam-d.
These propositions concern time n-ehationsimip between
the sequence of price cimarmges, not the average cimange
over’some specific. period. Clearly, stock prices dm-ifted
upward dluninmg hoth hull nmiar-kets; but that does not
necessar’ilv mean that price changes wem’e con-i-elated
or- that thmer’e were ionmg n-umms of positive changes that
exceeded time rmiediarm change for- these periods. Put
differently, it tioes riot mmecessarily nuean that mmmarket
participants were ahile to pr’edic.t future changes in
stock prices by observing the past.
Greater Fools
Time nuotionl thmat self-feedimmg speculative tiutihihes,
Ott occasion, can drive stock prices is knowmm as time
‘gm-eater fool timeor-v.’’ Accordlirmgtri tins thmeory, people
n-egan’d the fundamentals as irrelevantt. Rather’, tlucy
buy stock on timebelief that some tbigger?) fool will buy
21FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1981
the shares from them at a higher- price in the future,
People maintain this belief because they think “that
market values will rise — as they did yesterday or last
week—and aprofitcan be made.”~Once the specula-
tion begins, stock prices continue rising because peo-
ple, seeing the rise in the pm-evious period, demand
additional shares in thebeliefthat pr-ices will commtirmue
to rise. This pushes prices still higher.
The greater fool theory is based on time presunmption
that there are times when past movements in stock
pt-ices matter. According to this theory, during the
“fooling” periods, there should he positive cot-relation
in the past sequence of pr-icechanges and long nuns of
positive changes that exceed the median change for
the sample period.
‘4Galbraith(1955), p. 23. See, as well, Malkiel (1981), pp. 31—49.
Recently, some economists have discussed the
possibility that stock pr-ices mnay contain “rational”
bubbles,” The theory of rationalprice bubbles is based
on the belief that some asset pm-ices (for example,
stock, gold and foreign currency prices) ar-c too vari-
able to be justified by vam’iation in the fundamentals,”
(A nuore fornmal theory of pn’ice bubbles is sumnmarized
in the appendix to this papem’J Bn-iefly, the theory says
that there may lie occasions when stock prices deviate
from the pm-ice that is consistent with the fundamen-
tals. The deviation is called a bubble.
“See Flood and Garber (1980 and 1982), Blanchard and Watson
(1982).West (1986), Diba and Grossman (1985 and 1986) and the
appendix to the paper.
“See, for example, Shiller (1981) and Mankiw, IRomer and Shapiro
(1985).
Rational Bubbles
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Bubbles must possess certain characteristics ifthey
ate to have economic significance:
Bubbles must bepersistent so that afom’ecast ofstock
prices based solely on the fundamentals is biased,
This means that fom’ecast erm’ors (actual price minus
forecast price) will tend to have the same sign and not
average out, The persistence of one-sided er’rors is
important because random variation in the data gen-
erally will cause the actual price to differ front any
well-constructed forecast of the price even though a
bubble is not present. ti bubbles were only a name
used to describe m’andom variation in the data, they
would not be very interesting,
Bubbles must be ecplosive in the sense that they
must grow at a rate that compensates the stock pur-
chaser fot-the additional amount invested in the stock
due to the bubble, ln addition, there may be a risk
premium to compensate stockholders for the addi-
tional risk that thebubble may burst,” ‘f’his character-
istic causes the price to deviate further and further
from the fundamentals for as long as the bubble lasts,
Bubbles can not be negative. A negative bubble
means that stock pr’ices are less than implied by the
fundamentals, ‘t’heexplosive characteristic ofbubbles
means that the prices implode with some chance that
stock prices will be negative at some futum’e date,”
Negative stock prices, however, are impossible; they
are inconsistent with the liability rules associated with
common stock which limit potential losses to the
extent of the initial investment,
RATIONAL BUBBLES AND STOCK
PRICE BEHAVIOR
The theory of rational Imubbles has implications
for the hmehavior of stock prices that are different than
the theomy of efficient man’kets.’°This is shown in tahie
2, wtiich makes use of the fundamentals theory of
stock price determination discussed above. Uric im-
por’tant assumption of this exanmple is that, at each
moment in time, investors expect dividends to grow at
a constant n’ate over-the future. To keep timings simple,
the example assumes that subsequent events confor’m
“See Dibaand Grossman (1985 and 1986), Blanchard and Watson
(1982), Flood and Garber (1980), West (1986) and the appendix to
this paper.
“See Diba and Grossman (1985 and 1986) and Blanchard and
Watson (1982).
“See Diba and Grossman(1985) and the appendix.
to time expectations of investors (perfect foresight, an
extreme version of rational expectations) and that the
dividend is initially expected to he $2, ‘rite expected
dividend is constant iii panel A (expected growth rate
is zer’o) but gr’ows in panel B at atm expected annual
r’ate of 2 percent. ‘lIme n’equim’ed discount rate is 10
percent, and a bubble of $1 occum’s in period zero,
Colunmn 3 of panel A computes time fundamentals
price, P- This is simply the expected dividlend, E,)D,.,)
= $2, (assumed constant in panel A) divided by the
diffen’ence between the m-equir-eddiscount rate, r = 10,
and the expected growth rate in dividends, g = 0. The
fundamentals price is $20 each period.
The foun’th column computes the bubble compo-
nemmt of the price. As discusser! above, the bubble
expands overtime at the r’equired discount rate, r, The
observed price, I’,, is the sum of the fundamentals
price and the bubble as in column 5,
Column hi calculates the pen’centage changes in time
pn’ice. ‘these ar-c positive. More impor’tantly, the num-
bers in column 6 rise oyen time indicating that this
bubble prodtices a timne series of observed price
changes that are positively correlated, The observed
price does not follow a random walk, Of course, the
real world is nevem- so neat, Changes in the fundamen-
tals — r’,g, E,D,j — may cause the observed price to
change in away that masks the bubble, Ifthat occurs,
however, it is not clear that the bubble is very impor-
tant since an investor’s behavior’ under the theory of
rational bubbles depemmds on his ability to detect the
presetice of bubbles,
‘l’he exatnple in panel B is similar to the example in
panel A except that dividends are expected to grow at
a 2 percent annual rate. Notice that this does not
change the qualitative result with respect to the ob-
served price changes, These rise river time and will he
positively correlated, The only difference between the
two exanmples is that time fundamentals price in panel
B rises (drifts upward) over time at a constant 2 per-
cent rate (see column 7). This results from the gr’owth
in dividends. While the fundamentals price drifts up-
wam’d at a constant n-ate of 2 pet-cent, the sequence of
changes in the fundamentals pm-ice are uncorrelated,
The fundamentals price will follow a random walk
with drift.
An important thing to note is that both the greater
fool theony and the theory of price bubbles discussed
in this paper’ imply that stock prices behave similam-ly.
Both reject the efficient markets hypothesis, which
implies that stock prices follow a n’andom walk,
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SOME PROBLEMS WITH BUBBLES
‘lime notion timat stock pm-ices at-c influenced by
bubbles is troublesome because it is not based on a
well—specified theory. A complete rlmeorv of bubbles
should idemmtifv the cause of bubbles irm ten-ms ofsome
pimermonmermori f/rat can be observed se/Xtratelv fromn
btrbhles themselves. Oct those occasions wlmetm the
cause is obsenved, a bubble simould also lie obsemved
and cormver’selv. This allows adirect test of the theory
anmd explains why bubbles nnay be observed on some
occasions but not otimers.
mm commtn-ast, time greater fool and n-ational bubble
theories do not suggest a cause ofbubbles timat can lie
observed separately. Rather, unusual pn’ice behavior
(time hublmle ) is attributed to ‘‘interise optirmmisnn,’’ ‘‘a
commmpulsionm to speculate’’ and ‘‘nmanias. ‘These do rmot
identify time cause of the bubble; they merely give the
br,rhble a diffen-ent name.”
‘llmese crrticismmms suggest tlmat attributing crashes in
stock prices to bun’stumg bubbles adds notiming to our
urmder-starmding of ~vlm~’ cm-ashes occur or how to pr-e-
vent simmmilar’ occur-r-ences in time future. To illustrate,
“Brunner and Meltzer (1987) note that
Some further reflections on bubbles and sunspots equilibria
should make us doubt their contribution to a uselul reconciliation
or analysis wirh critical observariens. The bubble term refers
neither directly nor indirectly ro any observable entities. It is
fundamentally ,nconsistent wilh any rational exploitation of intor-
marion invoked by the same analysis (p. 2).
See, as welt, Singleton (1987), pp. 28—30. Sirkin (1975) and Sch-
wartz (1981), p.25, question the bubble hypothesis as an explana-
tion of the 1929 crash,
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Wesley Clair Mitchell (a noted student of business
cycles~wrote that
B a combination of various agencies such as public
regulation oftIre prospectuses ofnew comnparmies, leg-
islation suppolted by efficienmr administration against
fraudulent promotion, more rigidrequirements on the
part of stock exchanges concerning the securities ad-
mitted to official lists, more efficient agencies for-giving
investor’s infornmation,armd more conservative policy
0mm the part ofthe banks toward speculative hoonms,we
have learned to avoid cen-tain of the n’ashest err’ors
committed by ear-tiergenerations.”
Mitchell made this statemnent in 1913 in reference to
the legislative and regulatoty precautions instituted
after the Panic of 1907. Like the cr-ash in 1929, tIme 1907
crash imad been attributed to aspeculative bubble,
EFFICIENT MARKETS VS. PRICE
BUBBLES: SOME EVIDENCE
The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that
stock prices follow arandom walk. The hypothesis has
no implication for the drift in stock prices. Pm-icesmay
be higher- or lower at the end of time period being
examined, Neither of these events is necessarily in-
consistent with the hypothesis. Rather, the hypotimesis
implies that time sequence of price changes are unre-
lated; they behave as random van-iaimles. In contn-ast,
time gm-eater- fool theonv and the theory of rational
bubbles discussed here imply that changes in stock
pmices are not randonm but ar-c positively m-elated.
Wimicim explanatiom’m is better supported liv the evi-
dence for the 1924—29 and 1982-437 hull markets?
To evaluate timese theories, data on the level of time
Dow Jones Industrial tndex are used. Two periods are
examined. Omme extends trom January 3, 1928, flmrouglm
September 3, 1929. ‘tlme second rutms fmonm Jam’mr.rany 2,
1986, through August 25,1987, The data are first differ-
etices of time log of the Dow’s daily closing level nmulti-
plied by 100 amid ar-c approximately equal to the daily
percentage change in the index. Each sample cormtams
more tharm 400 obsemvationms. Stock prices advanced
very rapidly in these periods. Ifbuhimles were present,
they should he apparent irm these data.
Were Stock Prices ~4Random Walk?
Table 3 presents the results ofa test (called a Box—
Pierce testi based on time estinmated autocon-m-elations of








dcx, this test ms designed to deter nimine iihethet them-c
is smgnmificant autocon relation mn the data, tim it is,
tihethcn cur rent ( harmges in the immdex ate related to
past ( hcnmmges. Recall that time effith mit mnarketsh~ potim
esis implh s timat past C lianges iii stock pn IIe arc
unm elated to I ontairmno infommation about I( un-n etmt on
futune cimanges Anenmpir-i( al counter part of thrs prop
osition is timat hangcs in time index ~ue nmot corn lated.
Cotm’ en 5( lv if time hypothesms that stock prit es w me
influcmmn, cci hi’ sclf—feeding bubbles is romr C’( t pend enmt
-tg( cimanges rn the index should lie positii (‘lv corr ci
ated.
Iable 3 simon’s test m-csults for the tts o periods drs-
cussed abot e. Nonme of thetest statisttcs immdicate sigmmi-
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Chart 2
An Illustration of a Random Sequence
Correlated Observations Li.








ii See Wonnacott and Wonnacott fl977), p.487.
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ficant correlation at conventional confidence levels.”
Stockpr-ices followed arandom walk, which is consist-
ent with the efficient markets hypothesis.
Table 3 also shows the mean change fom each pe-
riod.The means are positive and significantly different
from zero in a statistical sense. Today, the upward
drift in stock pr-ices during these time periods is obi’i-
ous. At tlmat time, however, the upward drift is not
something that investors could have bet on with any
confidence.
Runs Test
A mun is the number of sequemmtial observations
that are greater or less than the sample nnedian (the
middle value ofthe sample(. Ifa series of observations
exhibits too few runs relative to what is expected for
independent observations, the data are positively cor-
related or drawn from diffem-entpopulations.
The efficient markets hypothesis suggests that ob-
served changes in stock prices are uncorrelated, that
is, the changes are independent of one another. This
means, for exanmpie, that there is no tendency for a
lange positive change to be followed by another- lam-ge
positive change. Consequently, the sequence of ob-
served changes will nmove back and forth across the
median change for- the sample fairly frequently as
shown in panel A of chart 2. lf changes in stock pm-ices
“Daily data between October 22, 1929, and March 31, 1930, show
significant autocorreiation at various lags. This is likelya statistical
artifact produced by a substantial increase in the variance of the
data atthe timeof the crash in October and Novemberthat appears
to taperoff over time. Consequently,the significant correlations do
not suggest the presence of a bubble. Furthermore, stock prices
weredeclining atthis time and bubbles can not be negative.
am-c correlated as implied by the bubble hypothesis,
however, a plot of the observations in the omden’ that
they appear will indicate some tracking as shown in
panel B. This plot crosses the sample median infre-
quently. The example exhibits relativelylong and, con-
sequently, t’ewen- runs than expected of independent
observations.”
Table 4presents the results of a runs test forthe bull
mankets of the 1920s and 1980s. The third column of
the table shows the number of runs observed for daily
percentage changes in the DowJones Industrial tndex
during each period of rapidly increasing stock prices.
Column 4 gives the number of runs expected for a
series of (495 and 417) independent obsemvations and
column 5 gives the variance of this series. Since the
observed number of runs is nmot much different than
expected, the hypothesis that percentage changes in
the Dow ltmdex behaved randomly during the sample
periods is not mejected by this data.
‘l’he evidence on the behavior of stock prices Ias
chamacteHzedby the Dow Index) is not consistent with
the notion that stock prices wet-c driven by self-
feeding speculative bubbles during the 1920s and
1980s.
CONCLUSION
Many people attribute thestock marketcrashes of
1929 and 1987 to bursting speculative bubbles. The
perception that stock prices may be driven by bubbles
presents economic policynmakers with an important
problem because such bubbles suggest that plans to
“See Wonnacott and Wonnacotl (1977), pp. 486—88.
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save and invest nmay be based on im-rationalenter-ia ammd
subject to er-r-aticbehavior.
‘rhis papem has exarnimmed data on stock pr-ices
around the time of the Coolidge and Reagan hull
markets. The paper provides evidence contrary to the
notion that the cm-ashes weme the result of bursting
speculative bubbles. No evidence was found that
changes in stock prices were autocorrelated or- that
the data contained long runs. Rather, the data suggest
that stock prices followed a randonm walk. Tlmis evi-
dence isconsistent with the efficient markets hvpoth-
esis, which is based on the proposition that all mele-
vant and ascentainahle infonmation regarding stock
pm’ice fundamentals (interest n’ates, dividends, future
prospects, etc,I is contained in current stock prices.
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Appendix
Price Bubbles
The following assumes m’ational investom’s with infinite
time horizons and a complete set of markets, with these
assumptions, the solution tot’ the expected price of a share
of stock next period given the information set in t.
w,(, is its pm-ice tlmis period, P,, plus appreciation
dur-ing the period at the nmarket rate of discount, r, P,, less
the expected dividend in t + 1, E,IX,., w,i.’ This relation-
ship is sumnmanized in equation 1.
(ii E,IP,_, F w,I = 1’, + nP, — E,IX,_,
The fundamentals price is the discounted present value of
the expected future stream of dividends. ‘rhis is shown in
equation 2 for the price in period t.’ Note timat r-, is the i”
period intemest rate.
t
(21 P, = ~ O,E,(X,., F
i=1
0, = 1/Il + r,l’ <1
Ifthe expected dividend receipt is the same in each future
period, E,IX,, F w,l = E,{X,, w,lforalli;and the yield curve
is flat so that r, r, for all i, equation 2 can be r’ewrilten in
the following form,’
(3i 1’, = E,(X,~,F w.(/r,
Substituting 13( into 1( and collecting terms gives the solu-
tion that the expected price in period t÷ 1 is the pr’ice in
period t.
F w,i p.
The observed price in t + 1 canbe expressed as tlme period
expectation of the price in t + 1 (which, by the above ar-gu-
ment, is equal to P, and a white noise error term, e,~,asin
equation 4.
141P,,, P + ,.,
Equation 4 is consistent witlm the et’ficient markets solution
for asset prices.It implies that prices follow arandom walk.
ISee Brealey and Meyers (1984), pp. 45—47, and Blanchard and
Watson (1982), pp.296—97.
2See Shiller (1981), Blanchard and Watson (1982), West (1986) and
Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985).
3The data are consistent with this assumption during the period
analyzedin the shaded insert on page 21. Forexample, the average
difference between the yield on high-grade corporate bonds and the
call money rate was -30 basis points, which is not significantly
different from zero (t-score .74). Furthermore, the data are con-
sistent with the assumption regarding expected dividends, It is not
possible to reiect the hypothesis that dividends per share followed a
randomwalk, Thefirst differences ofdividends per share are a white
noiseprocess. The Box-Pierce statistics atlags 6, 12, 18 and 24 are
6.94, 12.33, 14.10 and 17.47. The dividend data are from Cowles
(1938).The data are annual for the period 1871—1930.
‘the notion expressed 1w Sen. King and otherst that the
coolidge market \vas the product of a price bubble that
eventually bursl is approxinmated by a theory tlmat allows
share prices to deviate from the fundamentals price in
period t by bubble, B,. with probability ~.‘ The average
duration of the bubble is 1/I 1-rn per-iods hefor-e it crashes,
Given the assumptions regarding expected hjtur-e divi-
dends and time shape of the yield curve, a solution for the
pr-ice that allows for bubbles, p is:
(Si P[ = E,IX,., F d,(/r-, ±B,
B, = ‘trO ti, , + U, with probability it
B, = U,with probability 1 — ‘ii’
E,(tJ, F 4m, -- ,l = 0.
Substituting (5( into Ill and collecting temms gives the solu-
tion that the expected price of a share next period is its
price this period plus the appr-eciation in pr-ice due to the
period t bubble.
(UIE,IP,’,, F~ = P,’., + rB,
As long as the bubble lasts, the actual i-ate ofreturn from
holding the stock exceeds the nmam-ket i-ate of discount, r.
This compensates for the risk of a crash in the share price
should the bubble burst.
‘rhe price in t + 1 is the sum of the expected price arid a
white-noise error term.
(71P,’, =E,IP,, F4,i + e, = P,’ + r’,B, + c,
(SI E,IP,’_,—P,’i rB, = r,irO ‘B, , > u
Notice that the expected change gr-ows over tinme at i-ate i-so
the nmarket price is expected to deviate ftmn’timer from the
fundamentals price irm eacim subsequent period for as long
as the bubble lasts.
Furthermore, as showim hetow, tlme expected percentage
chammge in the pm’ice is not constant.
(91 EJIP,’ ,,—P,’I/P,’] = rB/P,
Stmbstittmting for’ P,’ from (Si and noting tlmat time futmdamen—
tals price, P~ E,{X,,, F ~,J/r-,, gives
(101 EJ(P .,—P,’(/P,’] = m’,ti/(P~+B,l m’/(P/B,—IL
Since B, gr-ows at rate m’, the per-centage change in pr’ice is
exper:ted to m’ise over time,
in contrast to the efficiemmt mar-kets solution, bubbles
irrmplvthat slmam’eprices do riot exhibit r-andonm walk pr-oper-
ties.
‘See Blanchardand Watson (1982), pp. 297—98.
30